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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: The COVID-19 pandemic has been adding pressures on companies to commit to 
their social and ethical responsibilities. CSR reporting is the main tool through which 
companies communicate their social behaviour and the need for credible information is 
censorious during the crisis. This paper aims to measure the level of COVID-19 disclosures in 
CSR reports by using an automated textual analysis technique based on a sample of UK 
companies and investigate whether the level of disclosure is enhanced for companies that 
subject their CSR reports to an assurance process. 
Design/methodology/approach: Our sample consists of FTSE All-share non-financial listed 
companies. We employ a computer-aided textual analysis and we use a bag of words to 
capture COVID-related information in the CSR section of the firm's annual reports. 
 
Findings: The results suggest that the existence of independent external assurance is 
significantly and positively associated with the provision of COVID-19 information in CSR 
reports. We also find that when assurance is provided by Big 4 accountancy firm, the 
disclosure of COVID-related information is enhanced. Furthermore, large companies are 
more likely to disclose COVID-related information in their CSR reports that are externally 
assured from top tier accountancy firms suggesting that assurance could be a burden for 
smaller firms. Overall, the findings suggest that assurance on CSR reports provides an 
‘insurance-like’ protection that mitigates the risks and signals the management’s ethical 
behaviour during the pandemic.  
Practical implications: Our approach helps to assess the level of corporate engagement with 
COVID-19 practices and the extent of related disclosures in CSR reports based on the Covid-
19 Secure Guidelines published by the UK government. This helps to emphasise how 
companies engage and communicate Covid-19 related information to stakeholders through 
CSR reports and ensure a safe working environment during this pandemic. Managers will 
need to assess the costs and benefits of purchasing assurance on CSR disclosures giving the 
ethical signal that assurance sends to the market and protection that it covers during the crisis.  
Originality/value: This paper provides a shred of unique evidence of the impact of the 
existence of external assurance and the type of assurer on the disclosure of COVID-related 
information in CSR reports. To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet investigated the 
corporate disclosure on an unforeseen event in CSR reports and the role of CSR assurance in 











COVID-19 pandemic has had considerable economic and financial effects worldwide and is 
considered the toughest challenge since the great depression (He and Harris 2020; Goodell, 
2020; Albitar et al., 2020a; Amankwah-Amoah, 2020). Managers are facing challenging 
decisions regarding their social and ethical behaviour during the pandemic and they need to 
respond proactively to protect their employees and customers (Levy, 2020). Governments and 
decision-makers worldwide have established economic and financial measures to help 
companies under strain from the COVID-19 pandemic. These measures should encourage 
companies to maintain ethical business practices and fulfil their CSR commitments to all 
stakeholders (He and Harris 2020). The UK government has issued COVID-19 safety 
guidelines to ensure a safe working environment (GOV.UK, 2020) and companies will need 
to follow these guidelines to ensure the safety of their employees, customers, and work 
environment. Nevertheless, companies are expected to disclose information related to 
COVID-19 prevention strategies to reduce information asymmetry and signal their 
performance to the market. Despite the fact that these practices are not strictly enforced, 
companies' provision of COVID-related information signals their ethical behaviour and how 
they operate during such a turbulent environment due to COVID-19 pandemic.  
Recent research investigating the effect of COVID-19 pandemic has mostly focused on 
market reactions (Erdem, 2020; Mazur et al., 2020; Salisu and Vo, 2020; Hossain, 2020) and 
provided theoretical perceptions of the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on financial markets, 
banking and insurance companies, CSR, auditing, and government and public sector 
(Goodell, 2020; Donthu and Gustafsson, 2020; Albitar et al., 2020a; He and Harris 2020; Levy, 
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2020). Other work has focused on the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on environmental 
awareness, sustainable consumption, and social responsibility (Severo et al., 2020) and the 
effect of ESG disclosures on corporate financial performance during the COVID-19 crisis 
(Broadstock et al., 2020). To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet investigated the 
corporate disclosure on an unforeseen event in CSR reports and the role of CSR assurance in 
this respect.  
Our paper adds to the existing literature on the external assurance of CSR reports (e.g., 
Cohen and Simnett, 2015; Ballou et al., 2018; Clarkson et al., 2019; Du and Wu, 2019; Hassan 
et al., 2020; Ruiz-Barbadillo and Martínez-Ferrero, 2020), and is motivated by studies that 
reflect on the role of CSR assurance in negative event situations. For example, Pflugrath et al. 
(2011) show that CSR assurance enhances credibility of CSR reports issued after a negative 
event, and Stuart et al. (2020) show that purchasing assurance on CSR reports signals 
management's ethical culture and provides 'insurance-like' protection from any potential 
reaction to future negative incidents. The motivation of our study is to examine whether CSR 
assurance choices (i.e., the purchase of assurance and assurance provider) enhance the extent 
of COVID-related disclosures in CSR reports during the COVID-19 crisis. The incentive to 
purchase voluntary assurance services can be framed in the context of the signalling theory. 
Assurance can signal that CSR information is reliable and increase the transparency and 
credibility of information (Simnett et al., 2009; Cohen and Simnett, 2015; Peters and Romi, 
2015).  
Due to COVID-19 pandemic, companies face challenging decisions regarding social 
performance and ethical thinking, and they need to conduct COVID prevention strategies to 
protect their employees and customers (Levy, 2020; Manuel and Herron, 2020). This paper 
aims to assess the degree of corporate disclosure on the COVID-19 pandemic in CSR reports 
and investigate whether such disclosure is improved for companies that subject their CSR 
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reports to an assurance process. We contribute to the CSR assurance literature in several ways. 
First, we employ a computer-aided textual analysis technique to examine COVID-19 
disclosures in CSR reports of UK companies. The use of textual analysis for qualitative 
information has been applied in several studies, and its importance is being recognised by 
different researchers (Clarkson et al., 2020; Andreou et al., 2020; Elmarzouky et al. 2020). 
Second, we investigate the impact of the existence of external assurance and the type of 
assurer on the disclosure of COVID-related information in CSR reports. As a result, we 
examine the role that CSR assurance could play during a negative event.  Third, we investigate 
whether there is a heterogeneity in the effect of assurance and assurance provider and COVID-
19 related disclosures in CSR reports when comparing big and small firms due to recourse 
implications during the pandemic.  
Using a sample of UK firms that published their annual reports in 2020, we assess the 
degree of COVID-related disclosures in CSR reports and find that the existence of 
independent external assurance has a positive and significant association with COVID-related 
information measured using both the frequency of COVID-related words appearing in the 
reports and a dummy variable. We also find that when assurance is provided by Big4 
accountancy firm, the disclosure of COVID-related information is enhanced. When we divide 
the sample into large and small firms, our result suggests that large companies are more likely 
to disclose COVID-related information in their CSR reports that are externally assured by a 
Big4 accountancy firm because they have the required resources to cover such cost than 
smaller firms. We further explore the influence of CSR-sensitive industries on the impact of 
CSR assurance and assurance provider on COVID-related disclosures, and our results are 
consistent. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
framework and develops the study's hypotheses. Section 3 describes the study's methodology, 
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including variable measurement, model specification, and sample selection. Section 4 analyses 
the study's findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
CSR reporting has attracted considerable attention from the academic community 
(Ballou et al. 2018; Boiral et al., 2019; Michelon et al. 2019). Studies show that assurance of CSR 
reports reduces stakeholders’ pressures because it enhances transparency and increases 
reporting quality (Ballou et al., 2018; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2018; Boiral et al., 2019). It can 
also improve the credibility and reliability of CSR reports (Simnett et al. 2009; Birkey et al., 
2016; Du and Wu, 2019; Hassan et al., 2020). The voluntary assurance of CSR reports will 
encourage firms to disclose more reliable and accurate information and strengthen companies' 
commitment to sustainability (Cohen and Simnett, 2015; Birkey et al., 2016; Ballou et al., 2018; 
Hassan et al., 2020).  
According to the signalling theory, companies with a proactive strategy and better 
ethical and social performance have incentives to provide more information to stakeholders 
to signal their positive practices and concerns for the environment and society (Clarkson et 
al., 2019). These companies will be willing to assure their CSR reports to signal stakeholders 
their commitment to sustainability (Mahoney et al., 2013; Gerged et al., 2018). Signalling 
theory suggests that while engaging in CSR assurance can impose costs, companies will buy 
assurance when the benefits outweigh the associated costs (Bangoli and Watts, 2017; Hassan 
et al., 2020). Companies may purchase assurance for their CSR reports to signal that they are 
socially responsible corporate citizen (Bagnoli and Watts, 2017; Hassan et al., 2020). Moreover, 
companies that voluntarily purchase professional assurance on a voluntary disclosure can 
distinguish themselves from less socially responsible companies (Clarkson et al., 2015) and 
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they choose to obtain high-quality assurance to distinguish their levels of socially responsible 
activities (Bagnoli and Watts, 2017). 
Assurance provider can play a crucial role in enhancing the quality of CSR reports 
(Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2018; Du and Wu, 2019; Hassan et al., 2020). In the UK institutional 
setting, firms can purchase assurance services from a wide variety of providers such as Big4 
accounting firms (Deloitte, E.Y., KPMG, and PwC), non-Big4 accounting firms (e.g., Grant 
Thornton), and specialist consultant and engineering services firms (e.g., Bureau Veritas).1 
Assurance providers can vary in their background and expertise (Perego and Kolk, 2012). In 
the absence of generally accepted reporting standards for CSR reporting and the complexity 
of CSR reporting content, high skilled assurance provider is required to enhance the quality 
of CSR reports (Cohen and Simnett, 2015; Martínez‐Ferrero et al., 2018). Research shows that 
top tier accountancy firms are more likely to provide higher quality assurance services 
because those firms have better experience in conducting detailed tests and analytical 
procedures (Gürtürk and Hahn, 2016; Farooq and de Villiers, 2019). CSR reports that have 
been assured by top tier accounting firms will have higher credibility because those firms have 
better expertise in risk assessment and consideration of materiality in providing assurance 
(Al-Shaer and Zaman 2019; Hummel et al., 2019). This can ease stakeholders' concerns about 
the transparency of CSR reports and enhance their confidence (Simnett et al., 2009; Martínez-
Ferrero et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 2020; Boiral and Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2020).  
Even though CSR assurance has attracted considerable attention from the academic 
community, more research work is deemed necessary to further investigate whether CSR 
assurance contributes to the provision of COVID-related disclosures in CSR reports. 
 
1The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) defines third-party assurance as “an engagement in which a 
practitioner expresses a conclusion designed to enhance the degree of confidence of the intended users other than 
the responsible party about the outcome of the evaluation or measurement of a subject matter against criteria.” See 
International Standard on Assurance Engagements, 2013. ISAE 3000 Revised - for IAASB.pdf (ifac.org). 
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Stakeholders are demanding companies to disclose information in relation to COVID-
prevention strategies and to explain their social and ethical behaviour during this pandemic 
(Broadstock et al., 2020; Levy, 2020). We would therefore expect that, according to signalling 
theory, companies that disclose COVID-related information in their CSR reports will purchase 
assurance to signal that the company is a socially responsible corporate citizen (Bagnoli and 
Watts, 2017). Companies will need to signal their ethical behaviour during the pandemic 
through CSR disclosures to show that they are creating COVID-secure environment for their 
employees, customers, and the public. Under these volatile conditions, we have seen many 
initiatives by the UK governments, professional bodies, and the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) to help firms deal with the pandemic which may affect the provision of COVID-19 
related information through corporate reporting (Albitar et al., 2020a). However, there is no 
mandatory requirement for entities to disclose information on facilitating a COVID-secure 
environment to protect their stakeholders. In light of the aforementioned discussion of the 
role of external assurance and assurance provider in enhancing the transparency and 
credibility of CSR disclosures, we investigate the association between the adoption of external 
assurance and type of assurer and the provision of COVID-related disclosures in CSR reports 
and propose the following hypotheses:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is an association between the adoption of CSR assurance and COVID-related 
disclosures in CSR reports. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is an association between CSR assurance provider and COVID-related 
disclosures in CSR reports. 
Company size is one of main factor that has an impact on political vulnerability since 
size represents the public presence, and large companies have the time and resources needed 
for voluntary disclosure (Milne, 2002). Larger companies, or those most visible, face 
reputational challenges that smaller and less visible companies do not. The profiles of these 
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companies give rise to the incurrence of costs necessary to manage these reputation 
challenges, which Watts & Zimmerman (1979) referred to as political costs. These might 
include, inter alia, the need to manage reputation with a range of initiatives including the 
voluntary disclosure of areas of interest to those demanding information or reassurances. 
Industry also attracts public attention especially certain industries that engage in activities 
with substantial impact on society or the environment. Certain industries endure high 
regulatory costs or contain large companies that make high profit and thus attract public 
attention (Milne, 2002).  
It is likely that legitimacy-based explanations are based on similar suppositions to 
political costs in that those companies with a specific size or activity vulnerabilities have been 
found to disclose more in those areas, conceivably to offset, nullify or address legitimacy gaps. 
In keeping with a legitimacy-based explanation, legitimacy gaps are more likely to open up 
when there is a pre-existing vulnerability occasioned by public exposure or industry sector 
(Deegan et al., 2000; Campbell, 2003). Stakeholders exhibit greater pressure on companies that 
are more visible. Voluntary disclosure of highly visible companies could help achieve 
legitimacy and gain public image (Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Albitar et al., 2020b; Li et al., 
2020). According to resource-based view framework, companies with resource endowments, 
such as greater size with higher profit invest in specific competitive advantage generating 
resources and engage in projects, including CSR projects (Barney et al., 2001; Russo and Fouts, 
1997; Li et al., 2020; Liao et al., 2020). Several studies show that larger companies are more 
likely to adopt assurance (Simnett et al., 2009; Zorio et al. 2013; Fernandez‐Feijoo et al. 2015). 
Big-sized firms are more likely to produce CSR reports and obtain higher quality assurance 
than small-sized firms since they have the required resources to do so. Furthermore, the cost 
of socially responsible activities differs across industries because of the use of different 
production technologies and facilities. Firms in mining industries or those whose production 
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facilities are suspected of offering poor working conditions are under greater scrutiny and are 
more likely to purchase higher quality assurance (Bagnoli and Watts, 2017). Based on the 
above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is heterogeneity in the impact of assurance and assurance provider on 
COVID-related disclosures in CSR reports when considering different firms' size and different CSR 
sensitive industries. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1. Sample 
We use a sample of FTSE All-share non-financial listed companies that their annual 
reports were published in 2020. We downloaded the annual reports from companies’ 
websites. We mainly focused on CSR's narrative reporting as this has been claimed to be an 
effective means of communication between managers and stakeholders (Barkemeyer et al. 
2014; Fisher et al., 2019). To extract the CSR narrative sections in annual reports, we use an 
automated textual analysis technique and utilise the Corporate Financial Information 
Environment (CFIE) software created by Lancaster University. CFIE is a research programme 
that explores accounting and financial market text using natural language processing and 
corpus linguistics methods (El-Haj et al., 2019). We exploit it to score the COVID-19 disclosure 
in CSR reports. We collect other related variables from Eikon database.   
3.2. Dependent Variable  
To measure COVID-19 disclosures in CSR reports, we followed previous literature for 
constructing a bag of words in the domain of narrative disclosures (Linsley and Shrives 2006; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Andreou et al., 2020). We use the wordlist developed by 
Elmarzouky et al. (2020) that is constructed based on the Covid-19 Secure Guidelines 
published by the UK Government (GOV.UK, 2020). We score the annual reports using the 
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CFIE software. We double-check the score manually for a random sample of CSR reports to 
assess the reliability of the measurement. The results remain consistence. Following 
Elmarzouky et al. (2020),  we also used Nvivo 12 pro as another validation of the measurement 
by re-scoring a random sample of CSR reports, and the results remain consistence. Appendix 
1 shows an examples of the original word list used for measuring COVID-19 disclosure. 
3.3. Explanatory Variables  
External assurance helps enhance information transparency and increase the 
completeness and credibility of CSR reports (Hodge et al., 2009; Pflugrath et al., 2011; Zorio et 
al., 2013; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018). Our variables of interest are the existence of external 
assurance and type of assurer. CSR_ assurance is measured using a dummy variable equal to 
1 if CSR disclosure is externally assured and zero otherwise. Prior literature argues that 
assurance service is perceived to be higher when assurance provider is a top tier accountancy 
firm (Junior et al., 2014; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018). Assurance provider (Assurance_ type) is 
measured using a scale where Assurance_ type equals 3 if assurance is provided by Big4 
accounting firm, 2 if assurance is provided by non-Big4 accounting firm, 1 if assurance is 
provided by non-accounting firm, 0 if no assurance service is provided. This scaling will allow 
us to provide preliminary evidence on whether assurance quality affects the disclosure of 
COVID-related information in CSR reports. 
Prior literature shows a link between governance variables and CSR disclosure 
(Husted and de Sousa-Filho, 2019; Al-Shaer et al., 2017; Majumder et al., 2017; Ullah et al., 
2019; Chan et al., 2020). We thus include some corporate governance variables. We expect that 
the existence of board-level CSR committee, measured using a dummy variable equals 1 if a 
committee exists and zero otherwise, to impact the disclosure of COVID-related information 
in CSR reports. We also include board size (BODSIZE) measured by the number of board 
members, board independence (BODIND) measured by the proportion of independent 
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directors on the board, and board diversity (BODDIV) measured by the proportion of female 
directors on the board.   
Prior literature suggests it is important to control for firm-specific characteristics when 
examining CSR reporting (Simnett et al. 2009; Nazari et al., 2017; Muslu et al., 2019). Larger 
firms with greater resources have opportunities to increase the scale and scope of their social 
and environmental activities and to disclose them (Al-Shaer et al., 2017). We control for firm 
size measured by the natural log of total assets. Firm resources are represented by profitability 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and TOBINSQ calculated by dividing the sum of firm 
equity value, book value of long-term debt, and current liabilities by total assets. We also 
control for financial leverage (LEV) measured by debt to total assets ratio, representing the 
firm's risk perception, and firm loss (LOSS) using an indicator variable equals one when the 
current year's net income is negative and zero otherwise. We control the firm's CSR 
performance in the previous year (ESG_perf) measured using the ESG score from ASSET4 
database. Finally, we control for the length of a document (Length) measured by the natural 
log of total word count in the CSR section and industry by grouping firms in the sample using 
the one-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. 
 
3.4. Empirical Model  
We construct the multivariate regression model below to examine the association 
between the adoption of external assurance and assurance provider and the provision of 
COVID-related disclosures in CSR reports. The variables used in this study are defined in 
Table I. Industry dummies are created based on the SIC one-digit industry classification. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +  𝛽𝛽8𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆




[Table I about here] 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table II reports descriptive statistics for key variables in our model. The mean value 
of COVID_score is 1.646 representing the average frequency of COVID_relared words 
disclosed in the CSR section, where the minimum number of words is zero, and the maximum 
is 40 words indicating that the majority of our sample companies have a low level of COVID 
related information in the CSR reports. During the pandemic, companies are facing a 
challenging situation and few companies have clear strategies of how to maintain social 
behaviour and ethical thinking to protect their employees and customers. The mean value of 
COVID_dummy is 0.333, indicating that on average, 33% of our sample firms disclose COVID-
related information in the CSR reports. The mean value of CSR_assurance 0.659 indicating that 
on average, 66% of our sample firms get their report externally assured and the mean value 
of Assurance_type is 1.984 suggesting that a large proportion of our sample firms have 
independent external assurance from non-Big4 accounting firms. The mean value of 
CSR_committee is 0.728 and suggests that on average, 73% of our sample firms have a separate 
CSR committee. We find the mean board size (BODSIZE) is 8.584, board independence 
(BODIND) is 0.608 which means that on average, two-thirds of our sample firms have 
independent directors, and on average, 28.4% of board members are females. The mean value 
of ESG_perf is 102.491. Regarding firm-specific variables, we find the mean firm size (SIZE) is 
£8,380,000,000, return on assets (ROA) is 0.047, TOBINSQ is 0.878, leverage is 0.690, and LOSS 
is 0.156 which suggests that on average, 16% of our sample firms reported a loss.  
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[Table II about here] 
 
Table III reports the Pearson correlation matrix for variables used in our analysis. We 
find that CSR_assurance, Assurance_type, CSR_committee, ESG_perf, BODDIV, and SIZE are 
positively correlated with COVID_dummy, indicating a significant overall positive 
association. The Pearson correlation coefficients provided in Table III do not evidence serious 
multicollinearity problems. The variance inflation factor (VIF) ranges between 1.15 (lowest 
value) and 2.24 (highest value), and the average value is 1.60. This also suggests the absence 
of multicollinearity.2 
[Table III about here] 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
We report the findings of our regression tests in this section. COVID_score is a count 
variable, and thus we use negative binomial specification, and COVID_dummy is a 
dichotomous variable, and thus we use probit regression. Table IV shows that CSR_assurance 
has a positive and significant association with COVID_score at 5% level (coeff=1.2418, t=2.21) 
and with COVID_dummy at 5% level (coeff=0.7095, t=1.98). Assurance_type has a positive and 
significant association with COVID_score at 1% level (coeff=0.5399, t=2.69) and with 
COVID_dummy at 1% level (coeff=0.5453, t=3.03).3 Our finding supports our hypotheses that 
when companies provide independent external assurance of their CSR reports and when the 
assurance provider is a Big4 accounting firm, they are more likely to disclose COVID-related 
information. Additionally, we find that BODDIV has a positive and significant association 
with COVID_score at 5% level (coeff=4.4199, t=2.50) and COVID_dummy at 1% level 
 
2 We conduct similar correlations when using COVID_score as the dependent variable (untabulated). 
3 CSR_committee, on the other hand, do not show to have an impact on both COVID_score and COVID_dummy 
possibly due to the lack of significant variations in the values of this variable in our regression tests. 
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(coeff=4.0573, t=3.28) suggesting that when firms have more female directors on the board, 
they would have stronger corporate governance. As a result, the disclosure of COVID-related 
information is more pronounced. Based on the theoretical perspective from signalling theory, 
our finding supports the argument that companies that provide disclosures on CSR 
information will purchase assurance to signal that the company is a socially responsible 
corporate citizen (Bagnoli and Watts, 2017). CSR assurance signals a positive ethical culture 
and provides an 'insurance-like' protection during times of crisis (Stuart et al., 2020).  
 
[Table IV about here] 
 
In Table V, we divide the sample into small-sized firms and big-sized firms based on 
the median to check whether our results are impacted by the size factor. Splitting the sample 
into small and large-sized firms helps analyse the effect of independent external assurance 
and assurance provider beyond any size effect. Our result for the sample of large firm shows 
that CSR_assurance has a positive and significant association with COVID_score at 10% level 
(coeff=1.644, t=1.74), and with COVID_dummy at 5% level (coeff=1.6097, t=2.32). 
Assurance_type has also positive and significant association with COVID_score at 5% level 
(coeff=0.5357, t=1.69) and with COVID_dummy at 5% level (coeff=0.5394, t=2.12). Among 
corporate governance variables, we find BODSIZE have a positive and significant association 
with COVID_score at 10% level (coeff=1.7434, t=1.70) and with COVID_dummy at 5% level 
(coeff=0.2761, t=2.46) and BODDIV has a positive and significant association with 
COVID_score at 1% level (coeff=8.6329, t=2.87) and with COVID_dummy at 5% level 
(coeff=7.667, t=2.55). Among firm-specific variables, LEV shows a negative and significant 
association with COVID_dummy at 5% level (coeff=-4.6852, t=-2.53). TOBINSQ shows to have 
a negative and significant association with COVID_score at 10% level (coeff=-5.0124, t=-1.72) 
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and with COVID_dummy at 5% level (coeff=-6.162, t=-2.27) and LOSS is positive and 
significant with COVID_score at 5% level (coeff=1.968, t=2.53) and with COVID_dummy at 5% 
level (coeff=1.9117, t=2.12) suggesting that companies that are less profitable and companies 
that are incurring losses are more likely to be disclosing COVID-related information in CSR 
reports. Managers of companies suffering from financial constraints might have more 
pressures about the firm current performance and disclose more information about COVID-
19 engagement practices. 
 Our results for the sample of small firms are less significant for our variables of 
interest, and only Assurance_type shows to be positive and significant at 10% level. The 
demand for assurance may place an increased drain on resource use when there is an 
insufficient market for resources (Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018). This is more likely to pertain to 
small firms and explain the weaker effects of CSR external assurance and assurance provider 
on COVID-related disclosures. Small firms may perceive that the incremental cost of external 
assurance outweighs the benefits, and such costs are hard to overcome, especially during the 
COVID-19 pandemic that affects the world economy and threatens firms' survival. 
[Table V about here] 
 
We examine the impact of CSR sensitive industries in Table VI. We include industry 
as a categorical variable following Sierra et al. (2013) and Al-Shaer and Zaman (2018) and 
assign a value of 1-5 based on firms' CSR-sensitive activities.4 We assign a value of 1 if the 
company belongs to technology and telecommunication industry, a value of 2 if the company 
belongs to consumer services and health care industry, a value of 3 if the company belongs to 
 
4 We have 14 companies out of 243 (5.76%) belong to technology and telecommunication industry, 166 companies 
out of 243 (68.31%) belong to consumer services and health care industries, 35 companies out of 243 (14.4%) belong 
to consumer goods industry, and 7 companies out of 243 (11.11%) belong to basic materials, utilities, and 
construction industries. We have only one company that belongs to the oil and gas industry. 
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consumer goods industry, a value of 4 if the company belongs to necessary materials, utilities 
and construction industry, and a value of 5 if the company belongs to oil and gas industry. 
Our findings are consistent with previous findings presented in Table IV and show that the 
existence of independent external assurance and the type of assurer have a positive and 
significant association with both COVID_score and COVID_dummy. Overall, findings in 
Tables V and VI support our hypothesis on the heterogeneity in the impact of assurance and 
assurance provider on COVID-related disclosures in CSR reports when considering different 
firms' size and different CSR sensitive industries. 
 
[Table VI about here] 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been affecting the global economy and adding pressures 
on companies to commit to their CSR matters during the crisis. Companies are facing 
challenging decisions regarding their social and ethical behaviour and they will need to 
respond proactively to protect their employees and customers (Levy, 2020). The independent 
external assurance of CSR reports helps enhance the transparency and credibility of reported 
information (Zorio et al., 2013). Companies' willingness to voluntary engage in the 
independent external assurance is likely to affect the level of COVID-related disclosures in 
CSR reports. This study investigates the impact of the existence of external assurance and the 
type of assurer on the disclosure of COVID-related information in CSR reports.  
Based on a sample of UK firms that publish their annual reports in 2020, we use a 
computer-aided textual analysis and use a bag of words to captures the COVID-related 
information in the CSR section of firm's annual reports. Our findings show that the existence 
of independent external assurance has a positive and significant association with COVID-
17 
 
related information measured using both the frequency of words appearing in the reports 
(COVID_score) and a dummy variable (COVID_dummy). We also find that when assurance is 
provided by Big4 accountancy firm, the disclosure of COVID-related information is enhanced. 
We also divide the sample into large and small firms and find that large companies are more 
likely to disclose COVID-related information in their CSR reports that are externally assured 
from a top tier accountancy firm because they have the required resources to cover such cost 
than smaller firms. We further explore the influence of CSR-sensitive industries on the impact 
of CSR assurance and assurance provider on COVID-related disclosures, and our results are 
consistent. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, many companies have been accused of neglecting 
health risks of workers and customers (Levy, 2020). Corporate managers are responsible for 
engaging in CSR initiatives that use CSR disclosure choices as an 'insurance-like' protection 
(Lee, 2020, Stuart et al., 2020) that would emphasise health and community resilience (Levy, 
2020). Companies will need to signal their ethical behaviour during the pandemic through 
CSR disclosures and the voluntary purchase of CSR assurance to mitigate the risks from 
irresponsible activities (e.g., safety or health issues) and protect their reputation and survival. 
Even though CSR assurance is still trailing among many companies, smaller companies in 
particular, due to its voluntary nature and cynicism about its net benefit (Stuart et al., 2020), a 
company that voluntary undertakes CSR assurance helps enhance perceptions of its ethical 
culture and intention to make disclosures subject to independent assessments (Stuart et al., 
2020).  
We recognise the heavy impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on companies' financial 
resilience and the underlying effect of the current economic crisis on corporate commitments 
to CSR. Managers will need to assess the costs and benefits of purchasing assurance on CSR 
disclosures giving the ethical signal that CSR assurance sends to the market and protection 
18 
 
that it covers during negative events (Stuart et al., 2020). Assurance signals a positive ethical 
culture and removes the burdens otherwise associated with businesses’ self-serving motives 
(Bagnoli and Watts, 2017). From a regulatory perspective, standard-setters and policymakers 
could consider issuing guidelines and establish reporting regulations for CSR disclosure 
practices to develop CSR policies in times of crisis. This might increase corporate engagement 
with CSR and improve sustainable performance. The success of such initiatives however will 
depend, inter-alia, on the disclosure of credible CSR related information. Our findings may 
help to inform regulators of the importance of CSR assurance choices in providing protection 
during the pandemic.  
Our paper has a few limitations that provide opportunities for future research. The 
findings are restricted to UK companies that published their annual reports in the first half of 
2020. Future study can expand on the sample size to get an overview of COVID-19 disclosure 
and capture the changes of reporting practices. Future research can investigate whether new 
CSR initiatives emerge during the pandemic (Lee, 2020), which will impact on existing CSR 
disclosures and assurance choices. Finally, research can also supplement our study by 
conducting interviews with various assurance providers and providing insights into CSR 
assurance providers' role within particular organisational and institutional settings during or 





Albitar, K., Gerged, A. M., Kikhia, H., and Hussainey, K. (2020a), “Auditing in times of social 
distancing: the effect of COVID-19 on auditing quality”, International Journal of 
Accounting and Information Management. In Press. 
Albitar, K., Hussainey, K., Kolade, N., and Gerged, A. M. (2020b), “ESG disclosure and firm 
performance before and after IR”, International Journal of Accounting and Information 
Management, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 429-444. 
Al-Shaer, H. (2020), “Sustainability reporting quality and post‐audit financial reporting 
quality: Empirical evidence from the UK”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 
29 No. 6, pp. 2355-2373. 
Al-Shaer, H., and Zaman, M. (2018), “Credibility of sustainability reports: The contribution of 
audit committees”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 27 No. 7, pp. 973-986. 
Al-Shaer, H., and Zaman, M. (2019), “CEO compensation and sustainability reporting 
assurance: Evidence from the U.K”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 158 No. 1, pp. 233-
252. 
Al-Shaer, H., Salama, A., and Toms, S. (2017), “Audit committees and financial reporting 
quality: Evidence from U.K. environmental accounting disclosures”, Journal of Applied 
Accounting Research, Vol. 18 No 1, pp. 2-21. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2020), “Stepping up and stepping out of COVID-19: New challenges 
for environmental sustainability policies in the global airline industry”, Journal of 
Cleaner Production, Vol. 271, pp. 123000. 
Andreou, P. C., Harris, T., and Philip, D. (2020), “Measuring Firms' Market Orientation Using 
Textual Analysis of 10‐K Filings”, British Journal of Management, Vol. 31 No. 4, pp. 872-
895. 
Bagnoli, M., and Watts, S. G. (2017), “Voluntary assurance of voluntary CSR 
disclosure”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol 26 No. 1, pp. 205-230. 
Ballou, B., Chen, P. C., Grenier, J. H., and Heitger, D. L. (2018), “Corporate social responsibility 
assurance and reporting quality: Evidence from restatements”, Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 167-188. 
Barkemeyer, R., Comyns, B., Figge, F., and Napolitano, G. (2014), “CEO statements in 
sustainability reports: Substantive information or background noise?”, Accounting 
Forum, Vol. 38, pp. 241–257. 
Barney, J. B., Wright, M. and Ketchen, D. J. (2001), “The resource based view of the firm: ten 
years after 1991”, Journal of Management, Vol. 27, pp. 625-643. 
Birkey, R. N., Michelon, G., Patten, D. M., and Sankara, J. (2016), “Does assurance on CSR 
reporting enhance environmental reputation? An examination in the U.S. context”, 
Accounting Forum, Vol. 40 No. 3, pp. 143-152. 
Boiral, O., Heras-Saizarbitoria, I., and Brotherton, M. C. (2019), “Assessing and improving the 
quality of sustainability reports: The auditors' perspective”, Journal of Business Ethics, 
Vol. 155 No. 3, pp. 703-721.  
Boiral, O., and Heras-Saizarbitoria, I. (2020), “Sustainability reporting assurance: Creating 
stakeholder accountability through hyperreality?”, Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 
243, pp. 118596. 
Broadstock, D. C., Chan, K., Cheng, L. T. and Wang, X., (2020), “The role of ESG performance 
during times of financial crisis: Evidence from COVID-19 China”, Finance Research 
Letters, In Press. 
Campbell, D. (2003), “Intra- and intersectoral effects in environmental disclosures: evidence 




Chan, S. H., Creel, T. S., Song, Q., and Yurova, Y. V. (2020), “Does CSR reporting indicate 
strong corporate governance?”, International Journal of Accounting and Information 
Management. In Press. 
Chen, L., Srinidhi, B., Tsang, A., and Yu, W. (2016), “Audited financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports”, Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 53-76. 
Clarkson, P. M., Li, Y., Richardson, G., and Tsang, A. (2015), “Voluntary external assurance of 
corporate social responsibility reports and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
membership: International evidence”, Unpublished working paper, UQ Business School. 
Clarkson, P., Li, Y., Richardson, G., and Tsang, A. (2019), “Causes and consequences of 
voluntary assurance of CSR reports”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 32 No. 8, pp. 2451-2474. 
Cohen, J. R., and Simnett, R. (2015), “CSR and assurance services: A research agenda”, 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 34 No. 1, pp. 59-74. 
Dawkins, C. E., and Fraas, J. W. (2011), “Erratum to: Beyond acclamations and excuses: 
environmental performance, voluntary environmental disclosure and the role of 
visibility” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 99 No. 3, pp. 383-397. 
Deegan, C., Rankin, M., and Voght, P. (2000), “Firms' disclosure reactions to major social 
incidents: Australian evidence”, Accounting forum, Vol. 24 No 1, pp. 101-130.  
Donthu, N., and Gustafsson, A. (2020), “Effects of COVID-19 on business and research”,  
Journal of business research, Vol. 117, pp. 284. 
Du, K., and Wu, S. J. (2019),  “Does external assurance enhance the credibility of CSR reports? 
Evidence from CSR-related misconduct events in Taiwan”, Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 101-130. 
El-Haj, M., Alves, P., Rayson, P., Walker, M., and Young, S. (2019), “Retrieving, classifying 
and analysing narrative commentary in unstructured (glossy) annual reports 
published as PDF files”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 6-34. 
Elmarzouky, M., Albitar, K., Karim, A. E., and Moussa, A. S. (2020),  “COVID-19 disclosure: a 
novel measurement and annual report uncertainty. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348393802 
Erdem, O., (2020),  “Freedom and stock market performance during Covid-19 outbreak”, 
Finance Research Letter, Vol. 36. 
Farooq, M. B., and De Villiers, C. (2019), “The shaping of sustainability assurance through the 
competition between accounting and non-accounting providers”, Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 307-336 
Fernandez‐Feijoo, B., Romero, S., and Ruiz, S. (2015), “Multilevel approach to sustainability 
report assurance decisions”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 346-358. 
Fisher, R., van Staden, C. and Richards, G. (2019), "Watch that tone: An investigation of the 
use and stylistic consequences of tone in corporate accountability disclosures", 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 77-105. 
Gerged, A. M., Cowton, C. J., and Beddewela, E. S. (2018), “Towards sustainable development 
in the Arab Middle East and North Africa region: A longitudinal analysis of 
environmental disclosure in corporate annual reports”, Business Strategy and the 
Environment, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 572-587 
Goodell, J. W. (2020), “COVID-19 and finance: Agendas for future research”, Finance Research 
Letters, Vol. 101512. 
GOV.UK. (2020). Working safely during coronavirus (COVID-19) - Guidance - GOV.UK. 
[ONLINE] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/working-safely-during-
coronavirus-Covid-19. [Accessed 18th September 2020]. 
21 
 
Gürtürk, A., and Hahn, R. (2016), “An empirical assessment of assurance statements in 
sustainability reports: Smoke screens or enlightening information?” Journal of Cleaner 
Production, Vol. 136, pp. 30–41.  
Hassan, A., Elamer, A. A., Fletcher, M., and Sobhan, N. (2020), “Voluntary assurance of 
sustainability reporting: Evidence from an emerging economy”, Accounting Research 
Journal (forthcoming). 
He, H., and Harris, L. (2020), “The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Marketing Philosophy”, Journal of Business Research. In press. 
Hodge, K., Subramaniam, N., and Stewart, J. (2009), “Assurance of sustainability reports: 
Impact on report users' confidence and perceptions of information credibility”, 
Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 178-194. 
Hossain, M. (2020), “The effect of the Covid-19 on sharing economy activities”, Journal of 
Cleaner Production, Vol. 280, pp. 124782. 
Hummel, K., Schlick, C., and Fifka, M. (2019), “The role of sustainability performance and 
accounting assurors in sustainability assurance engagements”, Journal of Business 
Ethics, Vol. 154 No 3, pp. 733-757. 
Husted, B. W., and de Sousa-Filho, J. M. (2019), “Board structure and environmental, social, 
and governance disclosure in Latin America”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 102, pp. 
220-227. 
Junior, R.M., Best, P.J., and Cotter, J. (2014), “Sustainability reporting and assurance: a 
historical analysis on a worldwide phenomenon”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 120 
No 1, pp. 1-11. 
Ioannou, I., and Serafeim, G. (2012), “What drives corporate social performance? The role of 
nation-level institutions”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 43 No. 9, pp. 834-
864. 
Lee, S. (2020), “Corporate social responsibility and COVID-19: Research implications”, 
Tourism Economics. In press 
Levy, D. L. (2020), “COVID‐19 and Global Governance”. Journal of Management Studies. In 
press. 
Li, Z., Liao, G., and Albitar, K. (2020), ”Does corporate environmental responsibility 
engagement affect firm value? The mediating role of corporate innovation”, Business 
Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 1045-1055. 
Liao, G., Hou, P., Shen, X., and Albitar, K. (2020), “The impact of economic policy uncertainty 
on stock returns: The role of corporate environmental responsibility engagement”, 
International Journal of Finance & Economics. In press. 
Linsley, P. M., and Shrives, P. J. (2006), “Risk reporting: A study of risk disclosures in the 
annual reports of U.K. companies”, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 
387-404. 
Loughran, T., and McDonald, B. (2011), “When is a liability not a liability? Textual analysis, 
dictionaries, and 10‐Ks”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 66 No. 1, pp. 35-65.  
Mahoney, L. S., Thorne, L., Cecil, L., and LaGore, W. (2013), “A research note on standalone 
corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or greenwashing?”, Critical 
perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 24, pp. 350-359.  
Majumder, M. T. H., Akter, A., and Li, X. (2017), “Corporate governance and corporate social 
disclosures: a meta-analytical review”, International Journal of Accounting and 
Information Management, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 434-458. 
Manuel, T., and Herron, T. L. (2020), “An ethical perspective of business CSR and the COVID-
19 pandemic”, Society and Business Review. In press. 
Martínez-Ferrero, J., García-Sánchez, I. M., and Ruiz-Barbadillo, E. (2018), “The quality of 
sustainability assurance reports: The expertise and experience of assurance providers 
as determinants”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 27 No. 8, pp. 1181–1196. 
22 
 
Mazur, M., Dang, M. and Vega, M., (2020), “COVID-19 and the March 2020 stock market crash. 
Evidence from SandP1500”, Finance Research Letters. In Press. 
Michelon, G., Patten, D.M. and Romi, A.M. (2019), "Creating legitimacy for sustainability 
assurance practices: evidence from sustainability restatements", European Accounting 
Review, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 395-422. 
Milne, M. J. (2002), “Positive accounting theory, political costs and social disclosure analyses: 
A critical look”, Critical perspectives on accounting, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 369-395. 
Muslu, V., Mutlu, S., Radhakrishnan, S., and Tsang, A. (2019), “Corporate social responsibility 
report narratives and analyst forecast accuracy”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 154 No 
4, pp. 1119-1142.  
Nazari, J. A., Hrazdil, K., and Mahmoudian, F. (2017), “Assessing social and environmental 
performance through narrative complexity in CSR reports”, Journal of Contemporary 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 166-178. 
Perego, P., and Kolk, A. (2012), “Multinationals' accountability on sustainability: The 
evolution of third-party assurance of sustainability reports”, Journal of Business 
Ethics, Vol. 110 No. 2, pp. 173-190. 
Pflugrath, G., Roebuck, P., and Simnett, R. (2011), “Impact of assurance and assurer's 
professional affiliation on financial analysts' assessment of credibility of corporate 
social responsibility information”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 30 No. 
3, pp. 239-254. 
Russo, M. V. and Fouts, P. A. (1997), “A resource-based perspective on corporate 
environmental performance and profitability”, The Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol. 40 No. 3, pp. 534-559. 
Ruiz-Barbadillo, E., and Martínez-Ferrero, J. (2020), “Empirical analysis of the effect of the 
joint provision of audit and sustainability assurance services on assurance quality”, 
Journal of Cleaner Production, pp. 121943. 
Salisu, A. A. and Vo, X. V., (2020), “Predicting stock returns in the presence of COVID-19 
pandemic: The role of health news”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 71. 
Severo, E. A., De Guimarães, J. C. F., and Dellarmelin, M. L. (2020), “Impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on environmental awareness, sustainable consumption and social 
responsibility: Evidence from generations in Brazil and Portugal”, Journal of Cleaner 
Production, pp. 124947. 
Simnett, R., Vanstraelen, A., and Chua, W. F. (2009), “Assurance on sustainability reports: An 
international comparison”, The Accounting Review, Vo. 84 No. 3, pp. 937-967. 
Sierra, L., Zorio, A., and García‐Benau, M. A. (2013), “Sustainable development and assurance 
of corporate social responsibility reports published by Ibex‐35 companies”, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Vol. 20 No. 6, pp.359-370. 
Stuart, A. C., Bedard, J. C., and Clark, C. E. (2020), “Practitioner Summary: The Value of 
Assurance and Ethics in Difficult Times: Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures 
and Investor Decisions. Current Issues in Auditing. In press. 
Ullah, M. S., Muttakin, M. B., and Khan, A. (2019), “Corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility disclosures in insurance companies”, International Journal of 
Accounting and Information Management, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 284-300 
Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L. (1979), “The demand for and supply of accounting theories: 
the market for excuses”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 54 No. 2, pp. 273–305. 
Zorio, A., García‐Benau, M. A., and Sierra, L. (2013), “Sustainability development and the 
quality of assurance reports: Empirical evidence”, Business strategy and the environment, 













CSR Assurance  = 1 if CSR information is externally assured, 0 otherwise. 
CSR Assurance Provider = 3 if assurance is provided by Big4 accounting firm; 2 if assurance is 
provided by non-Big4 accounting firm; 1 if assurance is provided by non-
accounting firm; 0 if no assurance service is provided 
SUSCOM = 1 if a board level sustainability committee exists, 0 otherwise. 
ESG_perf ESG performance composite measure generated from a weighted score of 
firms’ social, environmental and governance indicators from Thomson 
Reuters’ Assets4 (in previous year). 
BODSIZE Number of directors on the board 
BODIND Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BODDIV Proportion of female directors on the board 
LEV Debt to total asset ratio 
ROA Return on assets ratio measured by net income to total assets 
TOBINSQ Sum of firm equity value, book value of long-term debt, and current 
liabilities divided by total asset 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to one when the current year’s net income is 
negative, and zero otherwise 
SIZE Natural log of total assets  
Length Length of the document measured by the natural log of total number of 
words in the CSR section 
IND Industry dummy. Grouping industries using the DataStream Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 1 industries, creating ten groups 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variables  N Mean  SD Min Max 
COVID_score 243 1.646091 4.806832 0 40 
COVID_dummy 243 0.3333333 0.4723775 0 1 
CSR_assurance 243 0.6588235 0.4755051 0 1 
Assurance_type 243 0.7613169 0.8817628 0 3 
SUSCOM 243 0.7283951 0.4457053 0 1 
ESG_perf 242 102.4909 31.30142 28.43861 185.5065 
BODSIZE 243 8.584362 2.101771 4 16 
BODIND 243 0.6083462 0.1429224 0.125 1 
BODDIV 243 0.2843536 0.1001816 0 0.5714286 
LEV 243 0.6900631 1.879777 -14.51104 7.844407 
ROA 243 0.0473287 0.0864786 -0.4222273 0.4379708 
TOBINSQ 243 0.8777013 0.1076318 0.3155324 1.00014 
LOSS 243 0.8436214 0.3639636 0 1 
TOTAL ASSETS 243 8380000000 30900000000 91100000 295000000000 
Readability 243 41.06513 30.05657 -106.8853 248.9067 






















Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
COVID_dummy 1              
CSR_assurance 0.3162 1             
Assurance_type 0.2910 0.7107 1            
SUSCOM 0.1178 0.0268 0.0762 1           
ESG_perf 0.2268 0.1630 0.1934 0.4581 1          
BODSIZE 0.061 0.0277 0.1402 0.2981 0.2572 1         
BODIND 0.0227 -0.0491 0.0751 0.0731 0.1929 0.0312 1        
BODDIV 0.1310 -0.0154 0.0534 0.0886 0.2933 0.0557 0.2896 1       
LEV 0.0506 0.1317 0.1634 0.0311 -0.0143 -0.0133 0.0044 0.0585 1      
ROA -0.0654 0.0802 0.006 -0.0769 -0.0278 -0.0092 0.1127 0.1454 -0.1296 1     
TOBINSQ -0.1017 0.0752 -0.0113 -0.2004 -0.1643 -0.1232 0.0296 -0.0402 -0.1117 0.2145 1    
LOSS 0.0401 0.0165 0.0506 -0.0846 -0.0244 0.0281 0.1952 0.1027 -0.0507 0.6196 0.0691 1   
SIZE 0.1496 0.0936 0.3103 0.3479 0.4187 0.5547 0.1937 0.2415 0.2049 -0.1373 -0.2722 -0.0086 1  
Readability 0.3369 0.083 0.0497 -0.0451 -0.0262 -0.0926 -0.039 -0.1026 0.0979 -0.0329 -0.0288 0.1069 -0.0234 1 




Table 4: Regression Results for the Full Sample  
 
 Negative Binomial Regression  Probit Regression  
Variables COVID_score COVID_dummy 
CSR_assurance  1.2408** 0.7095** 
 [2.21] [1.98] 
Assurance_Type 0.5399*** 0.5453*** 
 [2.69] [3.03] 
SUSCOM 0.0177 0.0655 
 [0.04] [0.22] 
ESG_perf 0.1323 0.0337 
 [1.03] [0.38] 
BODSIZE 0.445 0.183* 
 [0.58] [1.38] 
BODIND -0.5206 -0.3079 
 [-0.48] [-0.32] 
BODDIV 4.4199** 4.0573*** 
 [2.50] [3.28] 
LEV -0.0822 -1.6579** 
 [-0.67] [-2.01] 
ROA -2.416 -2.3803 
 [-0.87] [-1.41] 
TOBINSQ -1.4655 -1.0447 
 [-0.83] [-0.80] 
LOSS -0.0874 -0.0647 
 [-0.16] [-0.14] 
SIZE -0.2068 -0.1661 
 [-1.35] [-1.44] 
Readability 0.0253*** 0.0172*** 
 [5.94] [2.78] 
IND Included  Included  
   
Intercept -2.0035 0.046 
 [-0.60] [0.02] 
Wald chi2(14) 58.12 45.24 
R-squared  0.2819 
N 243 243 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 5: Additional Analysis: Size Effect  
 
 Large Firms Small firms 
 Probit Negative Binomial Probit Negative Binomial 
Variable  COVID_dummy COVID_score COVID_dummy COVID_score 
CSR_assurance  1.6097** 1.6440* -0.8183 0.6295 
 [2.32] [1.74] [-0.90] [0.67] 
Assurance_type 0.5394** 0.5357** 1.5722* 0.9736* 
 [2.12] [1.69] [2.41] [2.23] 
SUSCOM 0.2599 0.0846 0.1895 -0.0855 
 [0.45] [0.13] [0.33] [-0.13] 
ESG_perf 0.1659 0.0937 0.0888 0.1266 
 [0.97] [0.41] [0.60] [0.59] 
BODSIZE 0.2761** 1.7434* -0.141 -1.0079 
 [2.46] [1.70] [-0.89] [-0.71] 
BODIND -3.9742* -0.6175 -0.9865 -2.2276 
 [-1.85] [-0.26] [-0.71] [-1.41] 
BODDIV 8.6329*** 7.6670** 4.3271** 5.4125** 
 [2.87] [2.55] [1.99] [2.03] 
LEV -4.6852** -0.0864 0.1558 -0.1124 
 [-2.53] [-0.34] [0.10] [-0.55] 
ROA 2.8294 4.7873 -2.8594 -4.9788 
 [0.51] [0.89] [-0.73] [-1.11] 
TOBINSQ -6.1620** -5.0124* 0.1785 -1.6618 
 [-2.27] [-1.72] [0.06] [-0.45] 
LOSS -1.9117** -1.9680** 1.074 1.5782 
 [-2.12] [-2.53] [1.05] [1.37] 
SIZE -0.2814 -0.3447 0.4477 0.2266 
 [-1.46] [-1.40] [1.02] [0.44] 
Readability 0.0248*** 0.0318*** 0.0302* 0.0239*** 
 [3.35] [4.85] [1.79] [3.47] 
IND Included Included Included Included 
Intercept 5.6352 2.6575 -14.2716 -8.5895 
 [1.21] [0.43] [-1.50] [-0.78] 
Wald chi2(14) 44.52 51.11 35.83 32.45 
R-squared 0.4103  0.3666  
N 88 88 80 80 













Table 6: Additional Analysis: Industry Effect  
 
Negative Binomial 
Regression  Probit Regression 
Variable  COVID_score COVID_dummy 
CSR_assurance 0.7102** 1.2436** 
 [1.97] [2.22] 
Assurance_type 0.5344*** 0.5240*** 
 [3.00] [2.62] 
SUSCOM 0.0797 0.0373 
 [0.27] [0.09] 
ESG_perf 0.0455 0.1386 
 [0.51] [1.08] 
BODSIZE 0.0814 0.4819 
 [1.38] [0.63] 
BODIND -0.254 -0.4229 
 [-0.27] [-0.40] 
BODDIV 4.001*** 4.4272** 
 [3.25] [2.52] 
LEV -1.6155** -0.0675 
 [-1.97] [-0.56] 
ROA -2.3715 -2.4689 
 [-1.37] [-0.88] 
TOBINSQ -0.9214 -1.1643 
 [-0.73] [-0.68] 
LOSS -0.0714 -0.1131 
 [-0.16] [-0.20] 
SIZE -0.1674 -0.2118 
 [-1.44] [-1.38] 
Flesch 0.0174*** 0.0252*** 
 [2.84] [5.94] 
Sustainability Sensitive Industries  Included  Included  
Wald chi2(14) 59.63 45.85 
Intercept 0.7944 -1.2057 
 [0.31] [-0.37] 
R-squared  0.2839 
N 243 243 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Variables are as defined in Table 1.  
 
Following Sierra et al. (2013) and assign a value of 1-5 based on firms’ CSR-sensitive activities. We assign a value 
of 1 if the company belongs to technology and telecommunication industry, a value of 2 if the company belongs to 
consumer services and health care industry, a value of 3 if the company belongs to consumer goods industry, a 
value of 4 if the company belongs to basic materials, utilities and construction industry, and a value of 5 if the 
company belongs to oil and gas industry. 
 
 
 
 
